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The Two Bodies of Achieved Celebrity 
Chris Rojek ∗ 
Abstract: »Die zwei Körper bei erreichter Berühmtheit«. From Medieval to Tudor 
times, the doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies was fundamental in government 
and the reproduction of social order. The doctrine held that the body of the 
monarch is simultaneously mortal and immortal. In terms of the hegemony of 
the power regime, this was given by God. It has long been assumed that the 
rise of Liberal Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy put an end to Royal abso-
lutism. This paper uses the political thought of Carl Schmitt and Ernst Hartwig 
Kantorowicz to examine if this assumption is valid. The paper argues that the 
doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies survives in greatly translated form. The high-
est achieved celebrities today have two bodies, the one (biological and incorri-
gible), the other (mediated and incorrigible). The paper uses data from the 
posthumous existence of the highest achieved celebrities to substantiate this 
proposition. In turn, this leads to the beginnings of an enquiry into what the 
role of achieved celebrity in Liberal Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy, i.e., a 
society based on the principle of homogeneous equality, might be. 
Keywords: Immortality, fame, ascribed celebrity, achieved celebrity, attention 
capital. 
1.   Introduction 
It is in the nature of ascribed celebrity to make ultimate appeals to the necessity 
and relevance of its raison d’etre by reaching out to the rubrics of cosmology 
and tradition. After all, for ascribed celebrity, fame is not primarily a matter of 
talent, skill, or accomplishment. Rather, it is the gift of heredity (Rojek 2001). 
Prestigious bloodline delivers public renown, so that even an infant of royal 
blood is instantly famous. This is a direct reflection of immemorial privilege 
and custom. Typically, it is originally justified on a priori grounds, by reason 
of popular faith in the decree of a deity, a group of deities, or some other su-
pernatural force, of some sort. Historically speaking, this is apparent in the 
doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies. To our way of thinking, it is absurd to 
claim that a mortal can have two bodies. Conversely, for the Tudor kings of 
England and their courtiers, it was an article of faith, no less obvious and stead-
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fast than the certainty that the sunset will be followed by the sunrise. The doc-
trine may be investigated here to clarify some of the unusual features of as-
cribed and achieved celebrity, as well as the metaphysical nexus that both 
ultimately, share.  
In Kantorowicz’s famous study, he argued that the doctrine has its roots in 
medieval theology (Kantorowicz 1957). Like all counter-intuitive doctrines, a 
little elucidation is required to illuminate this now forgotten cast of mind. After 
all, we are accustomed to the idea that we have a single body, which is born, 
matures, and eventually dies. For most people, this is the beginning and end of 
the matter. Against this, it must be said that we are not monarchs, or perhaps it 
is better to say, Tudor monarchs. The latter took it as an irreproachable given 
that they possessed two bodies. As with all men and women, one body is bio-
logical and corruptible. The other is ruled by God to be incorruptible, and so 
eternal. In this second, but co-equal sense, the monarch is not a mere man or 
woman, but a character angelicus, a living immortal (Raffield 2017, 37). 
Somewhat more than a self-regarding, cranky point of view is at issue here. It 
is not just that Tudor monarchs thought about religion and embodiment in ways 
that contrast starkly with the present day. They also used this way of thinking, 
and acting, for political ends. 
Consider briefly the case of Henry VIII (1491-1547). Most readers will 
know that Henry VIII had six wives and was responsible for the English 
Reformation. The role of the doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies in his reign is 
less popularly appreciated. What is the issue here, and how does it relate to the 
topic of celebrity? 
First, it is necessary to be clear about the unique nature of ascribed celebrity 
that Henry eventually claimed was his due. In 1503, the eleven year old Henry 
VIII married Catherine of Aragon, the widow of his brother, Arthur. The union 
failed to produce a surviving male heir. This created a major crisis in the rela-
tionship and in the affairs of state. For, to Henry’s way of thinking, the cause of 
regal supremacy required him to have a son. This, together with his infatuation 
with Anne Boleyn, led him to press for a divorce from Catherine which, he 
knew, the Pope was unlikely to condone. Only something extraordinary could 
persuade Rome to grant Henry’s desire for divorce. But whither the grounds? 
In order to understand the mind-set of the king, it is necessary to remark that 
this was not a question that Henry asked of other men, he asked it of God. 
What, in God’s view, could permit Henry to legitimately divorce Catherine? 
The answer was found in the Book of Leviticus. Henry believed that a passage 
here dissolved the legality of his marriage to Catherine: 
If a man shall take his brother’s wife,  
it is an impurity. He hath uncovered  
his brother’s nakedness: they shall be 
childless (Leviticus 20,12). 
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Henry was convinced that no Pope could contravene this edict. His argument 
was that scripture was superior to papal authority and canon law in faithfully 
interpreting the word of God (Redworth 1987, 32). Leviticus provided him 
with the pretext to insist that only divorce would cleanse his (unintended) sin. 
Even at this high point of ascribed celebrity, it was not sufficient for Henry to 
make his case alone. He already required experts, or in the language of Celebri-
ty Studies today, ‘cultural intermediaries,’ to represent him to Rome in the best 
light. Foremost among his appointees was Edward Foxe, Provost of King’s 
College, Cambridge. The tract that Foxe and his associates prepared was in-
deed fit for a monarch who saw himself as first among men and answerable 
only to God. According to them, the pope is categorized as nothing more than 
the ‘bishop’ of God’s diocese, i.e., Rome. In contrast, Henry is nominated as 
‘God’s Vicar on earth.’ It was not merely a distinction that privileged Henry, it 
exalted him. This anointed position situated the King in a relation of supreme 
power over his dominions, the clergy, and the laity (Guy 2014). By definition, 
no mortal was recognized to possess the authority to question his jurisdiction. 
The King had a duty to God, and to God alone was he accountable.  
The incisive effect of the doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies was to achieve 
a type of cultural transference which prima facie seems improbable, if not 
impossible (Greenblat 2009, 65). The immutability of the king in time was 
transferred from the sphere of theology to the sphere of law. That is to say, the 
metaphysical pretext for granting the King consummate, earthly authority was 
traced into the law books and court practices. The chief consequence of this 
was that theology was historically the footprint from which modern legality 
and politics took its cue. Revelation, drama, and ritual, which were the hall-
marks of Christian religion, became keynotes of political practice (Kahn 2009, 
77). As Western society developed the plebiscitary form of Parliamentary 
Democracy, the naked influence of religious theology on political practice 
became sedimented with innumerable secular justifications, rational codicils, 
and caveats. The fact that terrestrial factors have stepped up to take the place of 
God in ordering the affairs of mankind did not mean that politics freed itself 
from its metaphysical roots. Rather, reason, which after the Enlightenment, 
indiscriminately promulgated equality, liberty, and justice as the fundamental 
rights of man, remained the servant of presuppositions that were metaphysical 
in origin.  
The main argument of this paper is that, in the politics and culture of the 
present day, the doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies survives. However, as we 
shall see presently, it does so in a form much altered since the Tudor period. It 
has transferred over from ascribed celebrity to achieved celebrity. Before com-
ing to this in more detail, it is necessary to go a bit further into the proposition 
that political theology and practice is the child of metaphysics. 
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2.  Schmitt and the Dance of Liberal Fictions 
Kantorowicz’s argument is partly an engagement with the discredited German 
legal theorist and prominent jurist, Carl Schmitt.1 The latter argued famously in 
the 1920s that the modern secular state is based finally not upon the might of 
reason but upon the legacy of religion. The political concepts of the state are 
secularized transformations of theological precedents. The base of all politics is 
therefore judged to be metaphysics. Normative order is raised and maintained 
upon this foundation; however, it comes with a major problem. The metaphysi-
cal conundrums engrained in the central concepts of liberalism, saddle Plebisci-
tary Parliamentary Democracy with intractable, repeated dilemmas of system 
reproduction. For Schmitt, these conundrums stubbornly recur because the 
essential metaphysical contradictions of liberalism are insoluble. Liberal Ple-
biscitary Parliaments must operate in a context in which it is perfectly obvious 
that globally driven, multinational corporations have no political loyalties as 
such. The notion that “one man, one vote” amounts to anything meaningful in a 
world where global, corporate power decisively influences resource distribu-
tion and political accommodation is naïve. For Schmitt, there is something 
inherently superficial about the philosophy of liberalism. On this reckoning, the 
fate of Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy is sadly a most onerous and 
pitiful one. Because the real distribution of power is contrary to what Parlia-
ment purports it to be, the fate of Plebiscitary Democracy is to perpetually 
promise what, perpetually, it cannot deliver. Therefore, it is continually vulner-
able to the objection that the system as a whole is not working and cannot live 
up to the lofty standards that it has set itself. 
Schmitt contends that, what Habermas (1975) later called “the legitimation 
crisis” of Western liberalism is intrinsic to the bricks and mortar of Liberal 
Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy. The only serious question is whether it 
remains latent or becomes manifest. In 1985, he deployed a battery of argu-
ments to advance this case. Foremost among them is the proposition that the 
logic of liberalism is profoundly faulty. The central tenet of every known de-
mocracy is equality (Schmitt 1985, 13-16). If equality means anything, it 
means that all under its roof are homogeneous. By this token, it is incompre-
hensible to describe the society of the Tudor Kings as a democracy. For one 
thing, the doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies inflexibly arrogates divine rights 
to the monarch. Henry VIII believed that he was entitled to defy papal law 
because the king is the exception to the public law. The Medieval and Tudor 
state, therefore, determined that it is in the essence of sovereign power to have 
one foot in normative order, and the other in the realm of the divine. The king’s 
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ruined in academic and public life by reason of his perceived complicity with Nazism.  
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power derives finally, from the popular faith that the sovereign is, so to speak, 
‘super-normative.’ In the sight of ordinary men and women, the character of 
the courtly power that surrounds him is a corpus mysticum.2 This means that in 
Medieval (and Tudor) theology the monarch is understood to be potestas ab-
soluta in terra, i.e., to be among men, but to co-exist with autonomous motion 
not given to others (Herrero 2015, 1165).3 
Democracy expunges this principle from its estate. There is good reason for 
this. By definition, democracy is a society of equals, i.e., equal rights of en-
franchisement and equal liberties before the law. It cannot defer to heterogenei-
ty since to do so would be to compromise its raison d’etre. Thus, to Schmitt’s 
way of thinking, liberal democracy cannot be truly tolerant and inclusive. It is 
compelled to show a militaristic lack of tolerance and vigilant exclusivity to 
individuals and groups bringing heterogeneous characteristics and traits of 
behaviour that imperil the principle of homogeneity. This alone compromises 
the claim of liberalism to be a society of equals. In its bearing towards hetero-
geneity, it is finally exclusive and punitive. For example, it proclaims equality 
for all living within its territorial boundaries, but suspects aliens and foreigners 
because they do not conform to its standards of homogeneity. Plebiscitary 
Parliamentary Democracy is, in actuality, the indentured servant of metaphys-
ics.  
According to Schmitt (1985), this is far from being an end to the matter. For 
one thing, the proposition that liberalism is antithetical to heterogeneity means 
that it requires enemies and foes in order to uphold and refurbish its ‘way of 
life.’ This means that liberal democracies oblige a war-like orientation in their 
framework, if not in their demeanour.  
There is also the problem of the integral, fictive nature of equality under lib-
eralism. In order to illustrate what is at stake here, Schmitt (1985, 10) tellingly 
alights upon the example of the British Empire.4 The British portrayed their 
Empire as a morally virtuous project of nation-building on the grounds that it 
proclaimed and enforced equal, impartial standards of liberty and justice wher-
ever its flag was raised and flown. With inexorable logic, Schmitt admonishes 
the moral politics of this project as an absurdity. He regards it to be a gro-
tesque, self-serving philosophy, fit for a bargee land-grabber, but in no way 
acceptable to any jurist worth his salt. Of the more than 400 million inhabitants 
                                                             
2  Corpus mysticum literally means ‘mystical body’ (Kantorowicz 1957, 15). Its original referent 
was the Eucharist, or consecrated host. That is the symbol of Christ (and therefore God) in 
the normative order. Gradually, the notion evolved to refer to the idea that the Church is 
immutable. 
3  The term ‘autonomous motion’ refers to frictionless movement over others. 
4  Schmitt wrote this after the Treaty of Versailles (1919), which was widely regarded to be 
punitive in its requirements over the Germans. His doubts about the integrity of Liberal Ple-
biscitary Parliamentary Democracy surely derive from what John Maynard Keynes scathingly 
referred to as a ‘Carthaginian Peace’ of Versailles. 
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in the British Empire of Schmitt’s day, he calculated that over 300 million were 
not recognized as British citizens (Schmitt 1985, 10). Their rights and status 
were fudged by British ideologues through spinning constructs of administra-
tive convenience. By designating the adopted lands as ‘colonies,’ ‘protec-
torates,’ or governed by ‘mandates’ or ‘intervention treaties,’ their heterogene-
ous cultures were permitted to persist in their accustomed way of life, but only 
under sufferance to the sovereign Parliament of Westminster. If ultimate proof 
were needed to show the fictive character of equality in the British Empire all 
that is required is to look at the condition of the ‘native’ population. Deprived 
of the franchise and the civil rights enjoyed by the white settler and colonial 
governing population, the natives are embraced by the empire, but strictly as 
subordinate citizens. The empire depends upon their labour, but requires them 
to be a subject class in the public realm.  
When all is said and done, Schmitt (1985) concluded that, under the roof of 
liberal democracy, in which all nominally enjoy the same shelter, rights, and 
advantages, there is, in actuality, one law for the few and another for the major-
ity. Thus, the feted principle of equality is not truly realized. In Schmitt’s per-
spective, there is nothing surprising about this. If one moves away from the 
case of the British Empire to consider the validity of equality as a universal 
political right, things in liberalism fall apart in short order. People do not face 
one another as abstractions, but as “politically interested,” “politically deter-
mined” persons (Schmitt 1985, 11). To subtract these interests and determina-
tions from human encounters would be very far from leaving a balance of 
abstract equality which, ‘under the surface of difference,’ genuinely unites 
mankind. 
This is because abstract equality is vacuous since it does not recognize that 
all personas are “politically interested” and “politically determined.” “An abso-
lute human equality, then,” Schmitt concludes, “would be an equality under-
stood only in terms of itself and without risk; it would be an equality without 
the necessary correlate of inequality, and as a result, conceptually and practical-
ly meaningless, an indifferent equality” (Schmitt1985, 12). 
Where the reproduction dilemmas of liberalism become manifest and resist 
liberal parliamentary homilies, the stage is set for strong leaders to step out of 
the wings and take charge (Schmitt 2005). The strong leader is an achieved 
celebrity who possesses boldness combined with clarity of vision to sweep 
aside the parliamentary bottleneck and take decisive actions that count. The 
superior power of the sovereign leader resides in the capacity to “decide the 
exception” (Schmitt 2005, 36). Then, in spite of their differences, monarchies 
and republics are alike in important respects. The omnipotent dictator resem-
bles the omnipotent God, both analogically and in terms of autonomous motion 
(Roberts 2015, 467). Thus, the strong leader in the republic operates on the 
logic that he too possesses the power to ‘decide the exception.’ Corresponding-
ly, it should be noted that this feature is a prime element in accounting for their 
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glamour with the public. In conditions of emergency or crisis wherein Plebisci-
tary Parliamentary Democracy is in default, liberalism unintentionally provides 
for ‘strong leaders’ to save the day. At the time that he was writing the studies 
for which he remains most famous (and notorious), Mussolini and Hitler were 
emerging as veritable ‘saviours’ of their respective nations. But this is not the 
main component in the balance to be extracted from Schmitt’s thought here. 
3.  The Problem of Jurisdiction 
In Tudor England, an obvious question was raised by the doctrine that the 
monarch has absolute jurisdiction over people of all ranks. Was the King, who 
issues the laws of the land, also bound by them (Shoemaker 2017)? Not sur-
prisingly, Henry’s attempt to use Leviticus to annul his marriage to Catherine 
was refused by the Pope. In revenge, Henry sacked the authority and privileges 
of Rome. He declared himself Supreme Head of the Church of England and 
broke with the Papacy. Eventually, his hubris was ablated by excommunication 
from the Church of Rome. Far from being downcast, Henry regarded excom-
munication to vindicate the justice of his case. Those in England who opposed 
the Acts of Supremacy and Succession were brutally punished. At bottom, 
Henry proclaimed that he had breached the rule of a thousand years, which 
ordained that kings rule the bodies of their subjects, while it is for the pope to 
govern their souls. Now he declared himself to be doubly empowered, the body 
and soul of all in his dominion were henceforth to be at his command. Among 
all ascribed celebrities in history, he was determined to be first without equal.  
As a case study of ascribed celebrity, Henry VIII is peerless. He was the 
double exception. As we have seen, merely by virtue of bloodline, the doctrine 
of the King’s Two Bodies was sufficient to afford him instant fame. What 
heightened this to a stratospheric level was his conscious insistence that he was 
the Vicar of God, overriding the Holy Church of Rome. Thus, he became the 
defender of not only a territorialized earthly realm but also a divine religion in 
defiance of Rome that was destined to girdle the world by means of empire. In 
Christendom, this was unprecedented. For our purposes, it should be noted that 
this was not only a matter of practical statecraft; it was also, quite deliberately, 
a strategy of personal aggrandizement. Henry’s intent was to make his fame 
ubiquitous and beyond peradventure. By his own lights, the Most High and 
Most Excellent of Kings was also meant to be venerated as the world’s fore-
most ascribed celebrity. Prior to him, no other monarch in Christendom had 
sought to ‘decide the exception’ so dramatically. The judicial foundation for all 
of this pomp and panoply was the doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies. But the 
quest for immortal, global fame was the spur. 
Henry VIII was far from being the last English Monarch to make use of the 
doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies as a stratagem to claim exceptionalism. In 
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1649, when the Stuart King, Charles I, was brought to trial on the charge of 
treason by the leaders of the revolutionary army, of whom Oliver Cromwell 
was the foremost, he made repeated recourse to the doctrine of the King’s Two 
Bodies. The prosecution alleged that the king was “trusted with a limited pow-
er” which he rendered forfeit “out of a wicked design to erect and uphold him-
self an unlimited and tyrannical power to rule according to his will” (Petrie 
1935, 241). The prerogatives of Charles were condemned as sheer pretence, 
designed to advance and uphold a personal interest against the public good, 
common rights, liberty, justice and peace of the nation (Petrie 1935, 243). The 
heart of Charles’s defence was that his prosecutors had no lawful authority to 
submit him suffer trial. His privileged position over all other men and women, 
he argued, was commended by old and lawful descent, directly ordained by 
God (Petrie 1935, 245). “A king cannot be tried by any superior jurisdiction on 
earth” asserted Charles (Petrie 1935, 248). To the wrath of the court, he stuck 
to his guns on this fundamental principle. Like Henry VIII before him, Charles 
insisted that he was God’s vicar and, therefore, was independent of the com-
mands and judgements of men. It came to no profit. The court condemned him 
to death. On January 29th, 1649, as he faced the judgement of the axe, he was 
said to have commented, to the Bishop of London, “I go from a corruptible to 
an incorruptible crown, where there will be no more trouble” (Petrie 1935, 
273). The mortal body comes to dust, while the divine body joins the immor-
tals. 
Now, it might be considered that these matters between God and ascribed 
celebrity have no bearing on the analysis of achieved celebrity today. It is rea-
sonable to suppose that the matter of the King’s Two Bodies was settled with 
the execution of Charles I. To this line of argument, it might first be objected 
that the respect shown to the proposition that the dynamics of ascribed celebrity 
have anything to impart to achieved celebrities today is untenable. It goes 
without saying that ascribed celebrity continues to be a feature of the social 
order. But its absolutist credentials have been falsified. The doctrine of the 
King’s Two Bodies has no place in the world of science and ‘one man/one 
vote.’ But is it sound to propose that achieved celebrity, which has supplanted 
it, is free from metaphysics or the vestiges of the corpus mysticum from which 
it emerged? 
With the displacement of the monarch from the pinnacle of renown, the doc-
trine of the King’s Two Bodies fell on increasingly deaf ears. Parliamentary 
Democracy had finally overthrown the absolutism of the monarch and formal-
ly, at least, crushed the divine precept upon which exceptionalism resided. It 
could not have been clearer, or more binding. The body of the demos has re-
placed the two bodies of the king (Turner 2004, 2009). Contrarily, if anything 
is to be preserved from Schmitt’s (1985) critique of equality, it is the insight 
that Liberal Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy is a sham. Royal absolutism 
has been overcome. What remains is not, however, a homogeneous community 
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of equals. Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy perpetuates a real heterogene-
ity of power that the gloss of formal homogeneity denies. This is evident in the 
unequal political/cultural power that the rich have in comparison with the poor. 
It is also apparent that some individuals, despite being formally equal with the 
body politic, accumulate and advance cultural capital over others, which makes 
them extremely unequal in terms of status differentiation. 
Within the Liberal Parliamentary system, Schmitt’s (2005) principle of he 
who ‘decides the exception’ has survived as, what might be called, a ‘reserve 
procedure’ of political authority, i.e., it is implemented when the ordinary 
procedures of Liberal Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy are perceived as 
being at a loss to resolve a major structural crisis or emergency.  
Consecutively, it is by no means self-evident that this is the only, or even 
the most important, manifestation in society of the principle. In order to under-
stand the full import of this proposition, we need to probe more deeply into the 
question of how Liberal Democracy is perceived by the electorate. Of course, 
this is a complex, many-sided matter. But one measure of relevance and trust in 
the political system that no-one can argue with is electoral turnout in General 
Elections. In the five elections in the UK since 2001, turnout has ranged be-
tween 59.4% and 66.1%. In other words, nearly one third of those eligible to 
vote do not exercise their right.5 Turning to the European Parliament, in no 
General Election since 1994 has turn out been above the 50% mark. Half of all 
European citizens who have the right to vote refrain from doing so.6 Things are 
not much better in the US. On average, since 1972, a little over 50% of eligible 
adults have bothered to vote in Presidential elections.7  
These figures appear to bear out Schmitt’s (1985), thesis that Liberal Par-
liamentary Democracy perpetually fails to deliver what it perpetually promises. 
Its writ of competence does not have the full mandate of the people. Some 
commentators have characterized Liberal Democracy as a system of govern-
ment that, at best, ‘muddles through’ (Runciman 2013). Others have argued 
that it is not as a genuine democracy, but a ‘managed democracy’ which serves 
the interests of the state-corporate axis (Wolin 2008, 136-7). These analytical 
classifications, together with the low electoral turnouts recounted above, do not 
suggest that Liberal Parliamentary Plebiscitary Democracy is in a rude state of 
health.  
On the contrary, they imply that the political system produces low trust rela-
tions, i.e., the electorate do not believe that their vote will make a difference 
(Wolin 2008, 197). Low trust relations in organized politics breed a low trust 
society, in which atomization, alienation, and a sense of powerlessness are 
commonplace. People look for high trust relations in other quarters. Some of 
                                                             
5  Source: <www.ukpolitical.info/Turnout.45.htm>. 
6  Source: <www.ukpolitical.info/european-parliament-election-turnout.htm>. 
7  Source: <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data turnout.php>. 
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this might be found in the community action groups and larger social move-
ments that Beck (1992) referred to as ‘sub-politics.’ In these extra-
parliamentary settings, many people search for the clarity, decisiveness, and 
moral belonging that Parliament fails to deliver. Sub-politics are not alone in 
this respect. It is no accident that the culture of achieved celebrity has expanded 
in direct proportion to the expansion of popular knowledge, (through education, 
the mass media, and social media), of the reproduction dilemmas of Liberal 
Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy. Today, the power ‘to decide the excep-
tion,’ and escape and transcend normative order, so as to give a higher sense of 
subjective purpose and moral belonging, is prosaically found in the personality 
cults surrounding higher achieved celebrities. The sense of autonomous motion 
and the power to ‘decide the exception’ that they convey is the fundamental 
resource in their attention capital. 
Before endeavouring to put flesh upon these bones, it is incumbent to de-
clare plainly that, procedurally, there are steep impediments in the path of 
adopting Schmitt and Kantorowicz as reputable influences. As a Weimar legal 
theorist and, in time, a ‘Crown Jurist,’ Schmitt participated eagerly, and enthu-
siastically, in the attempt to justify Nazi rule (Minca and Rowan 2014, A1; 
Mehring 2014). He was a fervent anti-Semite. He defended Hitler’s extra-
judicial killings of political opponents and the ‘cleansing’ of German Jurispru-
dence of Jewish influence (Gross 2007). His vigorous defence of the necessity 
for ‘he who decides the exception’ in the moments of crisis faced by liberal 
democracy brilliantly revealed the hypocrisy of Plebiscitary Parliamentary 
Democracy in submitting that it had done with absolutism and sovereign rule. 
But Schmitt’s contribution was not just to invert a fallible load-bearing beam of 
liberalism. Inevitably, it also opened-up a pretext for absolutist solutions to be 
imposed upon the reproduction dilemma of Liberal Plebiscitary Parliamentary 
Democracy. Whether intentionally or not, Schmitt’s writings made it easier for 
Hitler to bootstrap his way to dictatorship in Germany. This is hard to ignore, 
or forgive. 
What of Kantorowicz? A disciple of the German poet and mystic Stefan 
George, he was a German Jew who volunteered for the First World War and 
fought at the front. After the Allied victory, he returned to join the right-wing 
Freikorps militia. He was personally involved in destroying Polish forces in the 
Greater Poland Uprising (1918-19) and the general strike in Berlin (1919), 
known as the Spartacus, or January, Uprising. Later, he was wounded in street-
fighting in Munich while fighting with nationalists against the socialist gov-
ernment (Fleming 2016, 105). Once it became incontrovertible that Nazi racial 
policy put even assimilated German Jews at risk, he fled Germany in 1938, 
making first to Oxford for a short interlude, and eventually to the University of 
California, Berkley, and finally, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.  
In mitigation, it need hardly be added that the virtues of an idea, or argu-
ment, bear no necessary correlation with the virtue, or want of virtue, of the 
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begetter. It is perfectly consistent to deplore the brutal, personal histories of 
Schmitt and Kantorowicz, while allowing for their respective accounts that 
metaphysics, secular law, and politics are worthy of reconsideration. This is the 
position adopted in the present study. 
4. The True Exceptionalism of Achieved Celebrity 
If this line of reasoning is itself to be held to be credible, it requires evidence. A 
start might be made by considering what metaphysical components, if any, 
apply to achieved celebrity today. Here at the outset, some of the theoretical 
working assumptions that obtain in the study of celebrity nowadays merit re-
gard. Despite the end of royal absolutism in the West, and the associated con-
demnation of the doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies, the cultural capital of 
achieved celebrity would not remotely have its grasp over the consciousness of 
commercial investors or the public unless it commanded assumptions regarding 
power, authority, and the metaphysical notion of autonomous motion. 
Prima facie, this may appear to be a large claim. So, it rewards us to list a 
few of the propositions conventionally made about achieved celebrity in the 
academic literature before going on to give concrete examples of the metaphys-
ical dimension in achieved celebrity. 
Achieved celebrities today have been proclaimed to be “intercessionary fig-
ures, gods in human form whose presence spans and translates between two 
worlds” (Frow 1998, 202). It is considered unremarkable to describe them as 
“objects of worship” who “mediate between internal and external reality” (Al-
exander 2010, 325). Theoretically, all of this suggests a deep homology be-
tween achieved celebrities and the sacred. The connection of achieved celebrity 
with the sacred accounts for the popular associations it has with autonomous 
motion and transcendence. 
Strictly speaking, there is nothing exactly new in the proposition that 
achieved celebrity and the sacred are connected. Morin suggested that the ce-
lestial position of ‘the stars’ in modern culture owes something to the popular 
perception that achieved celebrities possess super-natural, or quasi-super-
natural, powers (Morin 2005, original 1957). Therefore, the idea has been 
around for over half a century. 
Notwithstanding this, there are many sceptics. The objections are predicta-
ble. If celebrity is analogous to, or presumptive of, the sacred, what set of reli-
gious or metaphysical beliefs and institutions is at issue: Pagan, Animist, Chris-
tian, Muslim, etc.? Is it not more persuasive to analyze the influence of 
achieved celebrity by making excursions into economics and politics rather 
than into religion or metaphysics, i.e., by investigating the commercial and 
political strings attached to achieved celebrity?  
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Nathalie Heinich has perhaps presented the strongest articulation of this 
point of view. She dismisses the notions that celebrity culture entails both 
religious connections of recognition and belonging, and Christian motifs of 
extinction and ascent (Heinich 2014, 73). Instead, she regards celebrity to be a 
commodity, plain and simple, and the processes of celebrity elevation in public 
consciousness to be a matter of commodification, which has nothing to do with 
sanctification or metaphysical powers. By way of hard evidence, she cites 
Halpern’s proposition that the ‘enthronement procedures’ of a celebrity on the 
Hollywood Walk of Fame is analogous to the procedures of beatification in the 
Catholic Church, (Halpern 2007, Heinich 2014, 76). For Heinich, Halpern does 
not compare like with like and, therefore, his proposition cannot carry. In Hein-
ich’s view, the ‘crucial’ ball that he drops is that Hollywood enthronement 
procedures are entirely ‘civil’ in substance. Conversely, the Vatican’s confer-
ment of beatification is wholly religious, i.e., it refers to the judgement that an 
act (or acts) made by a mortal is of sufficient super-normative magnitude as to 
be classified as ‘saintly’ and, ipso facto, related to God.  
This will not do. Heinich may be right to object to the validity of Halpern’s 
comparison between the procedures of Hollywood and the Vatican. They are 
indeed not the same. However, her exercise in analytical cheeseparing slices 
celebrity off from any religious nexus. She serves it up as entirely a matter of 
civil society and commodification. Equally, she dishes up religion on a plate 
that has no place for politics or commodification. The difficulty with this is that 
it implies a polarization between civil society and metaphysics that Schmitt 
(1985, 2005) and Kantorowicz (1957) have already, convincingly rejected.  
Polarization is fundamentally a false conceptual dichotomy. Thus, it is a 
common criticism of the 26 year pontificate of Pope Jean Paul II that the Vati-
can fell to a multiplier effect, with respect to the rate of beatifications. Between 
1592 and 1978, the Church approved 269 beatifications (Barro, McCleary and 
McQuoid 2011). In the course of Pope John Paul II’s papacy, 319 beatifications 
were authorized. Pope Benedict XVI continued this inflationary trend. In the 
first four years of his papacy, 52 beatifications were approved (Barro, 
McCleary, and McQuoid 2011). It is not credible to regard this inflationary 
surge to be the product of purely religious considerations. What possible reli-
gious reasons can explain why John Paul II beatified more people in the course 
of his papacy than the previous 400 years combined? In a market for religious 
conversion, where secularization and other religions, especially in Africa and 
Latin America, are competing with the Catholic Church, beatification is recog-
nized as an evangelical tool, attracting people to Christ. The hypothesis must be 
that market pressures have adulterated the holy virtues and Catholic procedures 
of beatification. In other words, the Vatican has used beatification as a handy 
marketing device against the competition of secularization and rival religions, 
such as Islam, especially in Latin America and Africa. 
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Another example of the implausibility of the thesis that polarization pertains 
to both matters of civil society and metaphysics, in the ontology and social 
exchange of achieved celebrity, is supplied by moral panics against the idolatry 
of the star’s body. Say what you will, there is strong support in the literature for 
the notion that a confluence ‘between finite and infinite forces,’ and a ready 
accumulation of religious symbolism, mounts-up around the body of the high-
est achieved celebrities (Celeste 2005, 33; Williams 2009, 41). It is surely not 
by chance that, like God, the potent, multi-layered, super-normative and sacred 
meanings of these figures is reduced to a single word. ‘Elvis,’ ‘Marilyn,’ 
‘Marvin,’ ‘Dylan,’ ‘Jagger,’ ‘Lennon,’ ‘Kurt,’ ‘Bowie,’ ‘Prince,’ etc., com-
municate, at once, distinctive, complex systems of escapist, transcendent be-
liefs, identity rituals, rites of social inclusion and social exclusion and norma-
tive assumptions of social transactions, that have reciprocity with religion. 
They are doubly escapist in that they transport attention from the trouble-bound 
present to a path that, in the case of the ‘60s, was mythical, even in the telling; 
and they suggest transcendence, i.e., a future beyond the confines of the present 
and a cohesion with higher, super-normative levels. Achieved celebrities sym-
bolize escapism and transcendence. And what, after all, does religion mean, if 
not an institution that mobilizes types of meaning and experience that have to 
do with escapism and transcendence (Kolakowsi 1982)? Celebrity culture in its 
highest form is dramatically presented and understood as ‘super-normative.’ It 
uses religious imagery of revelation and magic to aggregate and intensify pub-
lic narrative fantasies, and it reproduces, in translation, the doctrine of the two 
bodies in ways that are acceptable to an age which has become, nominally, 
secular (Lofton 2011). In all of this, the ghost of Henry VIII haunts the estate. 
5. Conclusion: Immutable within Time 
Unsurprisingly, because of their popular association with autonomous motion 
and transcendence achieved celebrities have regularly faced moral panic and 
religious hostility. In respectable society, the main worry has not been so much 
that achieved celebrities will create a new church; it is that they act as popular 
idols, drawing energies, loyalties, and financial resources from the established 
church. In the era of the Silent Film (1895-1927), moral panics against screen 
idols like Rudolph Valentino, Clara Bow, Louise Brooks, and Theda Bara 
ranged on the imagery of sexual licence symbolized by their bodies. The latter 
were seen as escaping and transcending puritan, and respectable, boundaries 
and engendering the emergence of idolaters (Cohen 2001; Koszarski 2008). 
These silent film idols were widely thought to possess dangerous metaphysical 
powers that could wreak magic, and havoc, upon the public and conjure scripts 
of Godless salvation for the hopeless and the lowly. Subsequent vintages of 
achieved celebrity generated analogous moral panics and metaphysical, quasi-
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religious beliefs. Elvis Presley, Marilyn Monroe, Bob Dylan, Marvin Gaye, 
David Bowie, and Prince have all been examined as, inter alia, metaphysical 
cults and crusaders of new narratives of elevated belonging, sacred icons of 
new religious sentiments, and beacons of non-Godly salvation (McCann 1988; 
Marcus 1991; Cowan 2010; Till 2010).  
To be strictly balanced, in the case of all of these achieved celebrities it is 
doubtful if the attribution of genuine religious status holds up. Ultimately, they 
have not generated a sanctified liturgy, nor are they worshipped as the makers 
of undisputed miracles.8 However, their status in popular culture as idols, with 
exceptional powers of autonomous motion and transcendence, is much more 
persuasive. “We’re more popular than Jesus now,” declared John Lennon, in a 
newspaper interview in 1966. Nowadays, this reads like a classic stoner com-
ment, typical of the outlandish currency of many 60’s pop idols. However, at 
the time, Lennon’s remark outraged the media and incensed right wing Chris-
tian opinion, especially in the Southern states of the US. In it, they saw the 
hand of the Devil’s work (Sullivan 1987, 317-9). Certain Godless codes of 
lifestyle practice (‘permissive,’ in the case of Lennon) and orientations to sa-
cred values which were not exactly holy, but nonetheless regarded to be, and 
practiced, as sacred, made both orthodox religion and secularization look out-
moded and irrelevant.  
Synthetically, the doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies arrogated a triple lock 
of divine, legislative, and judicial power around the body of the monarch. To-
day, as befits historically significant forms of ascribed celebrity, certain kinds 
of power over others are still automatically acknowledged to be at the disposal 
of the monarch. The separation of the monarch from decisive powers over the 
church and the state has not eliminated honorific rights from the office. How-
ever, compared with the Tudor hierarchy of ascribed celebrity, the triple lock of 
divine, legislative, and judicial has been broken.  
It can be no part of any worthwhile argument to submit that the highest 
achieved celebrities have pirated these powers and taken them for their own. 
Their position does not reside upon a divine pretext, nor is it popularly com-
prehended to possess a serious legislative or judicial reach. Despite this, 
achieved celebrity is not grasped at all unless it is allowed that the authority 
and power of the highest achieved celebrities derives from the accepted, 
strength to ‘decide the exception,’ and invokes the glamorous prospect of au-
tonomous motion in their actions (Schmitt 2005, 36). The cultural importance 
of celebrity humanitarianism derives precisely from this premise. Under the 
                                                             
8  But contra Henich, churches have been founded around secular achieved celebrities who are 
regarded to have miraculous powers and to be transcendent. For example, in 1978, in the 
city of Rosario, Argentina, the Church of Iglesia Maradoniana was founded to worship the 
Argentinian soccer star, Diego Maradona. The Iglesia is estimated to currently have no less 
than 80,000 faithful (Moller 2017, 55). 
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‘demotic turn’ part of the cultural power of achieved celebrity comes from their 
acknowledged right and responsibility to ‘speak for us’ (Turner 2004, 2009). 
The popular connection between the highest achieved celebrities and a de-
territorialized mass goes very deep. The popular beliefs in autonomous motion 
and transcendence extend beyond personal biography. The highest achieved 
celebrities leave an indelible imprint upon the cultural biography of the times. 
Achieved celebrities are not just people, they are ‘recorded people’ (Castles 
2008). Their superior access to, and manipulation of, the media mean that we 
must think of them as having two bodies, a corrigible biological body and an 
incorrigible, mediated body. In media society we need to get used to the idea of 
the posthumous existence of the highest achieved celebrity. This means recog-
nizing the highest achieved celebrities not only as a memory, indexing cultural 
features of a vanished era, but as a real political and cultural force that exerts 
influence over the actions of others in the present. The faults of Liberal Plebis-
citary Parliamentary Democracy devalue official symbols, such as monarchs, 
prime ministers or presidents. Whatever popular appeal that elections or other 
events give them tends to be short-lived. In the media spotlight and weighed in 
the scales of popular interpretation, they are all parts of the discredited, elitist, 
‘system.’ In contrast, the highest achieved celebrities have become the unelect-
ed representatives of the people. The fact that their actions are formally unac-
countable does not impair their effects. In the mediated body of the highest 
achieved celebrities, the exceptionalism of autonomous motion and transcend-
ence has a tenable, trans-historical significance. 
The two bodies of the Tudor King expressed first a biological fact and a re-
lationship with the body politic. The corrigible body dies, as all bodies must. 
However, the incorrigible body is understood to be “immutable within time” 
(Greenblat 2009, 64). Like angels and spirits, they span the ages. The two 
bodies of the highest achieved celebrities have the same quality and same pur-
pose, which is to symbolize continuity in the body politic. The extraordinary, 
apparently spontaneous, tributes and memorials that follow the death of the 
highest achieved celebrities suggest a relationship between the star and the 
body politic which is understood to never die. 
A celebrity supernova refers to the death of achieved celebrities so central to 
public consciousness that their biological deaths are widely interpreted to signi-
fy the end of a cultural era (Rojek 2012, 1-2). A cliché in a certain kind of 
(functionalist) sociology is that the individual is an atom of society. To extend 
the analogy, the biological life-term of the highest achieved celebrity is a crys-
tal ball through which one may legitimately hope to survey and understand the 
entire society and culture of the era and provide a routeway to the future. It is 
not fortuitous, then, that the death of such a specimen produces waves of 
mourning and tributes that are not limited to the fan-base, but are culture-wide 
and unbounded in duration (we still ‘miss’ Elvis, Marilyn, and Marvin). De-
spite being physically dead, they are palpably present in culture.  
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One initial, concrete articulation of this is the assembly of ‘spontaneous 
shrines,’ to commemorate a celebrity supernova (Santino 2001). Fans, and 
people who would otherwise be bystanders, are caught-up in official, socially 
inclusive, ceremonial commemorative rituals. It is one thing for the people to 
leave flowers, messages and other offerings at a site associated with a beloved 
deceased monarch or political leader. This is what one would expect of a dead 
figure who symbolizes the official system. But the dead star is often perceived 
and valued as someone who lived outside the system and who represents de-
motic powers that organized politics and state occasions fail to encapsulate. 
Frequently, those who leave offerings at spontaneous shrines display scrupu-
lous attention and respect in their choice and positioning of leave-taking items 
(Graves-Brown and Orange 2017, 122). They are not only leaving markers that 
pay tribute to a great life, they are suggesting a template through which the life 
can be understood and its demotic significance measured. Flowers and toys 
figure prominently, as they do in funeral rituals for a loved one that is directly a 
member of the kith and kin network. Visual data relating to the spontaneous 
shrines assembled outside Amy Winehouse’s house in Camden Square, North 
London (where she died in 2011), were reminiscent of the spontaneous offer-
ings left outside the home of Freddie Mercury, where he died in 1991. They 
anticipated the spontaneous improvised shrines dedicated to David Bowie, who 
died in 2016 (the main ones were outside his apartment suite where he died in 
Lafayette Street, Manhattan and Tunstall Road, Brixton, where he grew up) 
(Graves-Brown and Orange 2017). The spontaneous shrine is popular and 
democratic, but simultaneously, it resembles the traditional, religious altar of 
worship, i.e., the immortal tabernacle of forgiveness and retribution that forms 
the axis of funeral rights in Orthodox Christian religion. Life dictates that these 
shrines are eventually taken down and cast aside. Yet outside Amy Wine-
house’s house in Camden Square and Bowie’s apartment in Lafayette Street, 
messages, flowers, and other offerings are still evident.  
The biological life of the star is popularly regarded to be just one of their 
manifestations. In Graham McCann’s phrase from 1988, when the highest 
achieved celebrity physically dies, what is left is “the body in the library.” In 
asking why high achieved celebrities such as James Dean, Marilyn Monroe, 
Judy Garland, Billy Holliday, Elvis Presley, John Lennon, etc., are immutable 
within time, the analogy of the star’s two bodies is inescapable. Technology 
means that the mediated (incorrigible body) can, theoretically, persist in culture 
ad infinitum. It is not however innocent. Like everything human, it is not free 
from politically interested, politically determined forces.  
The aims of the present paper will have been served if the reader is persuad-
ed that the doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies did not die with the overthrow of 
Royal absolutism. Its endurance, in greatly translated form today, reprises old 
questions relating to conglomerations of autonomous motion, metaphysical 
transcendence, and escapism around the body of celebrity. The troubling ele-
HSR Suppl. 32 (2019)  │  55 
ment in this proposition relates to the survival of a version of the doctrine in a 
political system of Liberal Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy that formally, 
is based on homogeneous equality. Is it sufficient to regard the highest forms of 
achieved celebrity as compensations for the failure of liberalism to perpetually 
deliver what it perpetually promises? Or does the complicity of achieved celeb-
rity, with autonomous motion, metaphysical transcendence and escapism, sug-
gest a deep, under-explored relationship between moral regulation and social 
conformity? For reasons of space, the exploration of relationships between the 
posthumous body of the highest achieved celebrities and these forces, must be 
a matter for future work. What can be claimed here is nothing more than a 
small lifting of the veil from a subject that I take to be of great interest to the 
study of celebrity. That is, the attainment by the highest achieved celebrities of 
a status only accorded to monarch’s between the Medieval and Tudor period: 
immutable within time. 
References 
Alexander, Jeffrey. 2010. The Celebrity-Icon. Cultural Sociology 4 (3): 323-36. 
Barro, Robert J., Rachel M. McCleary, and Alexander McQuoid. 2011. The 
Economics of Sainthood. In The Oxford Handbook Of the Economics of Religion, 
ed. Robert J. McCleary, 1-34. Oxford: OUP. 
Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society. London: Sage. 
Cashmore, Ellis. 2006. Celebrity Culture. London: Routledge. 
Castles, John. 2008. Big Stars. Perth: Network. 
Celeste, Reni. 2005. Screen Idols: The Tragedy of Falling Stars. Journal of Popular 
Film and Television 33 (1): 29-38. 
Cohen, Paula.M. 2001. Silent Film and the Triumph of American Myth. Oxford: 
OUP. 
Cowan, Sharon. 2010. The Elvis We Deserve: The Social Regulation Of 
Sex/Gender and “Sexuality” through Cultural Representations of the “King”. 
Law, Culture and the Humanities 6 (2): 221-44. 
Fleming, Paul. 2016. Secret Germany/Crooked Germany: Ernest H. Kantorowicz. 
Telos 176 (3): 102-20. 
Frow, John. 1998. Is Elvis a God? Cult, Culture, Questions of Method. 
International Journal Of Cultural Studies 1 (2): 197-210. 
Graves-Brown, Paul and Hilary Orange. 2017. The Stars Look Very Different 
Today: Celebrity Veneration, Grassroots Memorials And the Apotheosis of 
David Bowie. Material Religion 13 (1): 121-3. 
Greenblat, Stephen. 2009. Fifty Years of The King’s Two Bodies. Representation 
106 (1): 63-6. 
Gross, Raphael. 2007. Carl Schmitt and the Jews. Madison: University of Wiscon-
sin Press. 
Guy, John. 2014. Henry VIII: The Quest for Fame.. London: Allen Lane. 
Habermas, Jürgen. 1975. Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press. 
HSR Suppl. 32 (2019)  │  56 
Halpern, Jürgen. 2007. Fame Junkies: The Hidden Truth Behind America’s 
Favourite Addiction. Boston: Houghton Miflin. 
Heinich, Natalie. 2014. Limits of Religious Analogy: The Example of Celebrity. 
Social Sciences 3 (1): 71-83. 
Herrero, Montserrat. 2015. On Political Theology: The Hidden Dialogue Between 
C. Schmitt and E. H. Kantorowicz in The King’s Two Bodies. History of 
European Ideas 41 (8): 1164-77. 
Kahn, Victoria. 2009. Political Theology and  Fiction. Representations 106 (1): 
77-101. 
Kantorowicz, Ernst. 1957. The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political 
Theory. Princeton, Princeton: University Press. 
Kishlansky, Mark. 2014. Charles I: An Abbreviated Life. London: Allen Lane. 
Kolakowski, Leszek. 1982. Religion. London: Fontana. 
Koszasrski, Richard. 2008. Hollywood on the Hudson. New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press. 
Lofton, Kathryn. 2011. Religion and the American Celebrity. Social Compass 58 
(3): 346-52. 
Marcus, Greil. 1991. Dead Elvis. London: Penguin. 
McCann, Graham. 1988. Marilyn Monroe. Cambridge: Polity. 
Mehring, Richard. 2014. Carl Schmitt: A Biography. Cambridge: Polity. 
Minca, Claudio and Rory Rowan. 2014. The Trouble with Carl Schmitt. Political 
Geography 41: A1-A3. 
Moller, Verner. 2017. Sport, Religion and Charisma. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 
11 (1): 52-62. 
Morin, Edgar. 2005 [1957]. The Stars. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Petrie, Charles. 1935. The Letters of King Charles I. London: Cassell & Co. 
Raffield, Paul. 2017. Time, Equity, and the Artifice of English Law. Law, Culture 
and The Humanities 13 (1): 36-45 
Rasch, William. 2000. Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of 
Politics. Theory, Culture & Society 17 (6): 1-32. 
Redworth, Glyn. 1987. Whatever Happened to The English Reformation? History 
Today, October 1, 29-36. 
Roberts, Aaron B. 2015. Carl Schmitt-Political Theologian? The Review of Politics 
77 (3): 449-74. 
Rojek, Chris. 2001. Celebrity. London: Reaktion. 
Rojek, Chris. 2012. Fame Attack: The Inflation of Celebrity And its Consequences. 
London: Bloomsbury. 
Runciman, David. 2013. The Confidence Trap. A History of Democracy In Crisis 
from World War II to the Present. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Santino, Jack. 2001. Signs of War and Peace. London: Palgrave. 
Scmitt, Carl. 1988. The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
Schmitt, Carl. 2005. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of 
Sovereignty. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Shoemaker, Karl. 2017. The King’s Two Bodies as Lamentation. Law, Culture And 
the Humanities 13 (1): 24-35. 
Sullivan, Mark. 1987. ”More Popular Than Jesus”: The Beatles And the Religious 
Far Right. Popular Music 6 (3): 313-26.  
HSR Suppl. 32 (2019)  │  57 
Unterberger, Betty M. 1986. The Treaty Of Versailles: Carthaginian Peace Or 
Pragmatic Compromise? Reviews in American History 14 (3): 398-404. 
Till, Rupert. 2010. Pop stars and Idolatry: an investigation of the worship of popular 
music icons, and the music and cult of Prince. Journal of Beliefs & Values 31 (1): 
69-80. 
Turner, Graeme. 2004. Understanding Celebrity. London: Sage. 
Turner, Graeme. 2009. Ordinary People and the Media. London: Sage. 
Williams, Michael. 2009. The Idol Body: Stars, Statuary and the Classic Epic. Film 
& History 39 (2): 39-48. 
Wolin, Sheldon. 2008. Democracy Inc. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Copyright of Historical Social Research - Supplement is the property of GESIS - Leibniz-
Institute for the Social Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites
or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However,
users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
